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- Version 1. 3 3/1/92
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- Subject: EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT [Category: MGT]
-
- What to Expect.
- DISASTER/MAJOR EMERGENCY -- WHAT CAN WE EXPECT?
- by Lt. Dan Blackston, Chula Vista Police Department.
- The following list of seventy (70) "things to expect" is not
- offered as a prediction of doom. Although most of the items are
- negative, this is a realistic list of problem areas that we can
- expect to face in a disaster.
- Recognizing that problems will appear and giving some thought to
- them prior to a disaster are steps towards overcoming them. Some
- of the areas require specific actions; some will diminish with
- time; some are inherent in disaster operations and must simply be
- accepted.
- Although not every one of the 70 listed items will occur in every
- emergency, the majority of them will appear in most situations.
- You are encouraged to scan the list, determine which items are or
- may become your responsibility, and determine how those items
- could best be handled or the problem reduced.
- 1. In an earthquake, there may be violent ground shaking; it will
- seem to last much longer than it actually does.
- 2. Fires will occur, caused by electrical shorts, natural gas,
- fireplaces, stoves, etc.
- 3. Fires in collapsed buildings will be very difficult to
- control.
- 4. The extent of the disaster will be difficult to assess, though
- this will be necessary to assure proper commitment of resources.
- 5. Emergency equipment and field units will commit without being
- dispatched. There will be an air or urgency and more requests for
- aid than units available to send.
- 6. Communications will be inadequate; "holes" will appear in the
- system and air traffic will be incredibly heavy.
- 7. Trained personnel will become supervisors because they will be
- too valuable to perform hands-on tasks.
- 8. Responding mutual aid units will become lost; they will
- require maps and guides.
- 9. Water will be contaminated and unsafe for drinking. Tankers
- will be needed for firefighting and for carrying drinking water.
- 10. Citizens will volunteer but their commitment will usually be
- short-term.
- 11. There may be a multitude of hazardous materials incidents.
- 12. Aircraft will flood the area; law enforcement, fire, media,
- civilian, commercial and military aircraft will be a major
- concern.
- 13. The Command Post and/or EOC will be overrun with non-
- essential personnel; media, geologists, architects, engineers,
- representatives from other jurisdictions, etc.
- 14. Staging will be essential; the flow of personnel, equipment
- and supplies will be overwhelming.
- 15. Although it is an EOC function, the Field Command Post will
- become the temporary seat of government.
- 16. Electric power will be interrupted or will fail completely.
- 17. It will be difficult to shut of the gas; valves that are
- seldom, if ever, used will be difficult to find, and may not work
- when they are found. 18. Phone service will be erratic or
- non-existent. Pay phones will be the most reliable.
- 19. The media will have the best communications available; be
- prepared to share or impound their resources.
- 20. Fuel will not be available because there will be no
- electricity to run the pumps.
- 21. There will be an epidemic of flat tires; police, fire, and
- emergency medical vehicles will sustain a multitude of flat tires
- that will require repair in the field.
- 22. Fires will need to be investigated; mutual aid should include
- arson investigators.
- 23. The primary police department concern will be law
- enforcement; there will not be sufficient time or manpower to
- provide miscellaneous services.
- 24. It will be dark; there will not be enough generators or
- lights available.
- 25. Portable toilets will be in demand; there will be no place to
- go, and if a place is found there will be six photographers there
- to cover the event.
- 26. The perimeter will be difficult to control; citizens and
- media alike will offer good reasons why they should be allowed to
- enter the restricted area.
- 27. Search dogs will be needed early in the operation.
- 28. Documentation will be very important; there will be a
- multitude of requests for information later. 29.
- Riveted steel (oil and water storage) tanks may fail.
- 30. Streets will be impassable in some areas; it will be
- necessary to clear streets of rubble in order to conduct
- emergency operations.
- 31. The same buildings will be searched more than once unless
- they are clearly marked.
- 32. In earthquakes, there will be aftershocks; they will hamper
- emergency operations, create new fears among the citizenry and
- may cause more destruction than the original shock.
- 33. Many injured people will have to find their own way to
- medical treatment facilities.
- 34. Volunteer and reserve personnel may be slow to respond; they
- will put their own families' safety first.
- 35. On-duty public safety personnel will be concerned about their
- own families, and some may leave their posts to check on them.
- 36. Law enforcement and the media will clash; all media
- representatives should be referred to the Public Information
- Officer.
- 37. Very few citizens will utilize evacuation/mass care centers;
- they will prefer to stay with friends and relatives, or to camp
- out in their own yards.
- 38. Structural engineers will be needed to evaluate standing
- buildings for use as evacuation centers, command posts,
- information centers, first aid stations, etc.
- 39. The identification of workers and volunteers will be a
- problem; it will be difficult to determine who is working where
- and on what.
- 40. There will be rumors; people will be listening to their
- radios and must be given accurate information.
- 41. There will not be enough handie-talkies; batteries will soon
- go dead.
- 42. Many fire hydrants will be inaccessible (covered or destroyed
- by rubble) or inoperable.
- 43. Generators will run out of fuel; jerry cans of fuel must be
- obtained early to maintain generator powered lighting and
- communications.
- 44. Critical facilities will have to be self-sufficient; gas,
- lights, water and sewage may be out for days.
- 45. Emergency responders will require rest and must be relieved.
- Local personnel may be of value as guides for mutual aid
- responders, or as supervisors for volunteer crews.
- 46. Equipment will be lost, damaged or stolen, and may never be
- accounted for.
- 47. Someone will get the bill; record-keeping and accounting
- procedures will be important.
- 48. Traditional non-emergency personnel will want to go home at 5
- o'clock; all public employees must be made to realize that they
- are a part of the emergency response team.
- 49. People will die and there is nothing that can be done about
- it. Non-public safety personnel will not understand why everyone
- cannot be saved. Priorities must be set to save the most lives
- possible.
- 50. Dead bodies should not be an initial concern. Rescuing the
- living should be the first priority.
- 51. If phones are working, the number of requests for service
- will be overwhelming. People will have to fend for themselves; it
- will be difficult for dispatchers to ignore these pleas for help.
-
- 52. Some field units will "disappear"; you will not be able to
- reach them and will not know where they are or what they are
- doing.
- 53. Security will have to be posted at hospitals, clinics, and
- first-aid stations to control hysterical citizens demanding
- immediate attention.
- 54. Representatives from public agencies throughout the United
- States and many foreign countries will want to come and observe
- the operations or offer assistance. They will be a significant
- problem.
- 55. Department heads (EOC) staff may not have a working knowledge
- of their assigned areas of responsibility, and will "play it by
- ear."
- 56. Some citizens and media representatives will question your
- decisions because they will not recognize that the safety of
- field responders is paramount.
- 57. There are no critically injured in a disaster; only those who
- are dead or alive.
- 58. Handicapped and disabled persons will probably die unless
- personal family and friends can care for them and maintain their
- life-support systems.
- 59. Management will not be familiar with field response
- procedures, and may attempt to change standard operating
- procedures.
- 60. Emergency responders (public safety and medical alike) will
- not be adequately trained to respond efficiently.
- 61. There will be initial chaos; supplies, materials and
- equipment needed will not be readily available.
- 62. There will be a general lack of necessary information;
- coordinators will want to wait for damage/casualty assessment
- information to establish priorities.
- 63. Emergency equipment will not be able to reach some locations
- because of traffic jams. Tow trucks will be at a premium. Parked
- or abandoned vehicles will block streets, and emergency
- responders will be the worst offenders.
- 64. Even though there will not be enough people to initially deal
- with emergencies, many available personnel will never be
- identified and never used. After the initial shock, there will be
- too many volunteers.
- 65. General information will be offered in response to specific
- questions because field units cannot verify the requested
- information.
- 66. Individual public safety officers will be asked to do the
- work of squads or companies; they will have to recruit volunteers
- on the spot to provide assistance to their efforts.
- 67. The message flow to, from, and within the EOC and Field
- Command Post will break down and become inefficient and
- unmanageable.
- 68. There will be an overcritical desire to "verify" all incoming
- information. If it is received from a field unit, it should be
- considered as verified.
- 69. Some EOC and Command Post personnel will become overloaded;
- some will not be able to cope with the volume of activity and
- information they have to deal with, and some will not be able to
- cope with the noise and distractions.
- 70. Things will get better -- some time after they have become
- considerably worse. [RB053-061]
-
- REAL TIME EXPERIENCES & OBSERVATIONS IN EMERGENCIES
- This is the first of a series of suggestions, observations,
- findings, and criticisms by Amateur Radio operators. This opening
- statement applies to each and every subsequent part in this
- series and will not be repeated in the interest of brevity.
- Amateur Radio operators and served organizations met after the
- October 17, 1989 magnitude 7.1 earthquake in northern California
- to identify, discuss and document the good and not so good on
- both sides. From the thousands of words provided us in numerous
- after-action reports, I have boiled down the following as the
- most frequent findings. I'm sure there are many reports that were
- never provided us so we can only quote from those that were.
- We are indebted to those hams and agencies that shared their
- findings with us. As is our practice, we have sanitized the
- reports to eliminate individual names and callsigns. Most of
- these findings can or should be helpful to any volunteer or paid
- individual and organizations in their future training operations
- and exercises. Most of the findings apply to sound practices and
- procedures anywhere -- not just to an earthquake in California.
- It is in this spirit that we share these with you. In an attempt
- to categorize the findings I have broken them down into the
- following broad categories: Management, Operations, General,
- Packet, Plans/Preparedness, and Training.
-
- MANAGEMENT
- 1. "Sometimes ARES people forgot to look at the big picture.
- Decisions were then being made by people too close to the
- situation or people too weary to comprehend the scope of the
- event." Solution: "Identify before a disaster a list of people
- able to serve as supervisors or managers."
- 2. "Managers sometimes made decisions without consultation with
- those in the field." Solution: "Those overseeing the operation
- must also consult with, or be in touch with, those on the line."
- 3. "The Resource Net sometimes filled in vacant slots with the
- first ham that came along." Solutions: "(a) Every ham should be
- told to bring every piece of gear and every kind of clothing and
- to make sure that they are in excellent health. (b) Hams should
- be told to bring whatever is known to be required and to meet in
- a staging area."
- 4. "People would come from long distances and then discover
- overstaffing. They would then feel unwelcome and return home."
- 5. "Every city ARES EC should have liaison with the local
- hospitals."
- 6. "Better coordination of housing for hams coming from out of
- area is needed."
- 7. "The employer having dibs on the body makes active
- participation hard." (See General comment number 2).
- 8. "Better resource management needed -- database would have been
- useful."
- 9. "Personality conflicts arose during the course of the
- operation." Solution: "People don't have to like each other in
- order to work with each other. When possible, parties with
- disagreements should wait until after the incident to resolve
- them. If the disagreements are interfering with the running of
- the operation and the parties involved cannot reach resolution on
- their own, then they should agree to sit down with a higher level
- of management with a specific list of problem behaviors and their
- suggested resolution. The mediator/manager must help them devise
- a solution with the good of the group or the operation in mind."
-
- OPERATIONS
- 1. "There were complaints that some portions of the ham community
- did not understand the magnitude of the problem and so provided
- little support." Solution: "A status or situation report (SITREP)
- must be broadcast periodically."
- 2. "Two hams may be needed at each station -- one to serve as a
- runner and one to serve as the ham."
- 3. "Use tactical calls. ID with a ham call only when needed to
- fulfill FCC requirements."
- 4. "Staying overnight makes it nice to have two people."
- 5. "There is a greater need for ham radio discipline; hams need
- to follow/listen the Net Control Station (NCS)."
- 6. "There are shift change problems if you do not provide enough
- time for shifts to do a turn over or for a supervisor to give
- information out to each new operator. Relief should be present at
- least 30 minutes before the shift ends in order to do the
- turnover properly."
- 7. "H&W (Health & Welfare) is important but we need a structured
- way to address it. Maybe we need to split our [ARES] personnel
- into H&W and ARES? H&W and tactical communications are two very
- different missions!"
- 8. "Remember to be courteous on the air -- even during a
- disaster."
- 9. "Many messages lacked clear 'TO' and 'FROM' addresses.
- Remember that radio callsigns are not acceptable addresses."
- 10. "There was confusion over tactical callsigns and the overuse
- of callsigns between any two stations in communication with one
- another. Use the ham callsign only once: at the end of any
- two-way exchange or once every ten minutes -- whichever is less."
- 11. "We are communicators -- we shouldn't be making decisions."
- 12. "Brief relief operators!"
- 13. "We need to (a) work 8 hours and be off 8 hours; or (b)
- consider 8 hour shifts instead of 6 hour shifts."
- 14. "Backup power is needed for strategic repeaters."
- 15. "Lack of equipment in Red Cross communications center(s)."
- 16. "Always send 2 people on any assignment."
-
- PACKET RADIO
- 1. "Packet is useful for logistical traffic in a long operation."
- 2. "Surprised not to see packet used but maybe it wasn't planned
- out?"
- 3. "Packet grossly underutilized."
- 4. One county suggests packet may not have worked because "Many
- of the packeteers are also the best voice operators."
- 5. One person suggested packet also not desired because people
- have a need to "talk" in a disaster -- "not to type in a
- disaster".
- 6. "Cities need more information about our [ARES] skills;
- statistical information desired by many cities would have been
- great to go via packet on a preset form."
- 7. Felt packet not used enough "Because lack of packet
- portability; contact companies now to purchase equipment."
- 8. "Strategically placed packet for resource availability and
- equipment requirements would have been very helpful."
- 9. "Packet radio was needed."
- 10. "Places that needed packet may have been without
- electricity."
- 11. "It is hard to decipher manuals for packet during a disaster.
- Have drills involving packet with other peoples' systems."
- 12. "If cities and counties establish a RACES unit they can buy
- and have radios and packet terminals in place ready to be
- operated by any qualified ham operator."
-
- GENERAL
- 1. "Conflict between employment and volunteering; have EOC and
- Red Cross write letters to employers and maybe send a press
- release to the job." (See Management #7.)
- 2. "At County Communications is a small room for us with a lack
- of antenna drops and it has to be bigger. Technical improvements
- are needed."
- 3. "Have procedure manuals at County Communications."
- 4. "Label the ends of all coaxial cables [at any facility]."
- 5. "Headsets are needed on all base stations at any facility."
- 6. "There was a clear need to handle the ARES resources
- management better in the 'X' area, but the job did get done. The
- problem again is not the quantity of hams that are licensed but
- the quality. Only a small handful was willing to come and provide
- emergency communications when the chips were down. We must
- continuously address the issue of values and quality of Amateur
- Radio and not over simplify any exclusive quantity of
- technological advances."
- 7. "Use this event as an incentive to work out the kinks."
-
- TRAINING
- 1. "How do you train those who won't participate and be trained
- ahead of time?"
- 2. "How do you train the untrained?"
- 3. "We need to discipline ourselves better in following a
- directed net. Give practice in passing traffic."
- 4. The need for traffic handling reiterated.
-
- PLANS / PREPAREDNESS
- 1. "Radio clubs of companies (firms) should be involved with the
- ARES EC of the city in which the company club is located."
- 2. "We need to preassign hams to support the Emergency Broadcast
- System."
- 3. "Need to establish Memorandums of Understandings with
- different repeaters/groups before a disaster."
- 4. "Include an AM/FM radio in your list of necessary field
- response equipment."
- 5. "Pretest equipment. Use simple radios."
- 6. "Now is the time to check over radios and power cables."
- 7. "Separate power supplies are needed for radios."
- 8. "Some volunteers are not properly signed up Disaster Service
- Workers and this is jeopardizing the volunteer and his/her
- dependents." [RB 100-104 and 119-120]
-
- EMERGENCY DIRECTORS PERSPECTIVES - (LOMA PRIETA EARTHQUAKE
- CRITIQUE)
- Only one state and parts of two others are free from any threat
- of earthquakes. For this reason we continue to receive requests
- from volunteer communications services and the agencies they
- serve for any helpful information. I attended a military-
- civilian-common carrier critique following the October 1989 Loma
- Prieta (S.F. Bay Area) earthquake. It was a candid exchange of
- comments and observations by high ranking individuals. The theme
- was "Lessons learned from the earthquake". I am sure that you
- will be able to adopt one or more of the following statements to
- your own area. How many can you find?
- An Army general said, "Too many people show up wanting to be
- helpful. They should know in advance where they fit in or stay
- out of the way. If people don't know what to do or where to go,
- then someone isn't doing their planning job properly."
- A big city emergency management director said, "We didn't need
- ham radio operators. Our biggest communications problem was we
- didn't have any interdepartmental radio communications without
- cellular telephones." [The contradiction is clearly obvious to
- ham radio operators! This city has no RACES program but no
- shortage of hams who wish it did. ---KH6GBX]
- A big city fire department battalion chief said,
- "One: our plans did not work. They should all be redone. The
- Incident Command System works but it took more than a few days to
- make it work.
- Two: if you don't control the media, they will control you.
- Three: a mobile command post is extremely important.
- Four: we were hampered by a lack of simplex radio channels.
- Five: there must be a mechanism to coordinate volunteers."
- A county emergency management director said,
- "Communications: some lost or overtaxed it so bad we lost it. You
- must have redundant communications. Volunteers: you should have a
- plan on how to deal with and manage volunteers. They showed up
- uninvited in (one hard hit city) and nobody could use them. On
- the subject of ICS (the Incident Command System), you should all
- adopt it. Finally, in the recovery phase, we didn't do as good a
- job as we should have. We should train people how to use the ICS
- for the recovery phase, too."
- A gas and electric utility representative said,
- "Everybody needs to work on their communications systems. Our
- phones were overloaded for the first five days. Our mobile radio
- system was useless because our mountaintop remote base stations
- were all out. Generators failed because we don't use them. We all
- have to run them under load for more than just a few minutes."
- A state emergency management official said
- that we need to be more proactive by moving up certain resources
- to the periphery of the incident, rather than await dispatch from
- greater distances. She also said that we all should start placing
- as much emphasis on recovery operations as we do in response.
- An emergency medical service official said,
- "We instituted the earthquake plan and it really helped. The
- earthquake was not a catastrophic event but it did validate our
- planning. Lack of intelligence the first few hours is a problem
- -- it was zero. Communications needs to be established much more
- quickly. We need to set up a communications system in advance.
- One hundred of the 112 hospitals in the earthquake area were
- affected in one way or another."
- [Note: Several states have regional or statewide EMS radio
- communication systems. California does not.]
- The critique day concluded with management and communications
- workshops. Some key findings of the latter were that a four to
- eight hour communications battery backup is no good if there
- isn't a generator available. Batteries are simply a switchover
- bridge between commercial and generator power. Emergency power
- generators will fail when you really need them if they are not
- exercised and maintained frequently.
-
- A briefing on Amateur Radio was given to the communications
- workshop. Most of the governments that do not have a RACES
- program have little understanding of ham radio; at the time of a
- disaster is too late to find out. I explained that the RACES is a
- mutual aid resource similar to fire suppression, law enforcement,
- engineering and others. They are trained in emergency management
- procedures and operations, the ICS, public safety, disciplined
- operations and teamwork. A MARS representative concluded by
- explaining the MARS resources available to the military
- community. -- RB99 and 121
-
- FOOTNOTE TO BULLETINS-BY-TOPIC
- Ideas, questions and suggestions from many people contributed to
- these materials. In some instances quotations occur or articles
- authored are as indicated. RB reference is to the original RACES
- Bulletin issued by Stanly Harter, KH6GBX, State Races
- Coordinator, Office of Emergency Services, 2800 Meadowview Road,
- Sacramento, California 95832 between l985 and l992.Input and
- comments are welcomed by mail or packet radio to W6HIR @
- WA6NWE.#NOCAL.CA [Telephone 916-427-4281.]
-
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